Constitutional Law - Validity of Louisiana Fair-Trade Law by Farrier, James
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 18 | Number 1
The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the
1956-1957 Term
December 1957
Constitutional Law - Validity of Louisiana Fair-
Trade Law
James Farrier
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
James Farrier, Constitutional Law - Validity of Louisiana Fair-Trade Law, 18 La. L. Rev. (1957)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol18/iss1/37
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
outside the jurisdiction of the United States against the laws of
a foreign country.2 3 American citizenship does not give an Amer-
ican immunity from prosecution for the commission of crimes
in other countries, or entitle him to a trial in any other mode
than that allowed to its own people by the country from the laws
of which he has fled.24 The only difference between a case of
extradition and the instant case is that the respondent here is in
military service. However, the fact that the respondent did not
voluntarily leave the protection of continental United States law
does not create in him a constitutional right which he had never
had before, nor does it reduce the extent of the treaty-making
power of the United States. The involuntary nature of a soldier's
station is simply one more factor affecting the public opinion
which the United States Government must consider in bargain-
ing with another sovereign. It appears that the United States'
adherence to comity in international relations is sufficient to
justify a treaty by which American citizens are surrendered to
foreign powers in derogation of what respondent would call his
constitutional right to trial by the United States authorities. The
extradition example of the needs of the sovereign as weighed
against the rights of the individual would seem adequate prece-
dent for a like result in the instant case. Therefore, it is sub-
mitted that the decision of the United States Supreme Court is
legally sound.
William L. McLeod, Jr.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-VALIDITY OF LOUISIANA FAIR-TRADE LAW
Plaintiff sought to enjoin defendant from selling products
bearing the plaintiff's brand at a price below the minimum
which had been set in accordance with the Louisiana Fair-Trade
Act.' Defendant challenged the constitutionality of the act, and
particularly the "non-signer" clause which prohibited non-con-
tracting retailers from wilfully selling plaintiff's products under
23. Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109 (1900) ; Argento v. Horn, 241 F.2d 258
(6th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, No. 183, U.S. Sup. Ct. Bull. Current Term, p. 8024
(October 14, 1957).
24. See note 23 supra.
1. La. Acts 1936, No. 13, p. 62, incorporated as LA. R.S. 51:394 (1950). The
act consists of a contract clause providing that a contract shall not be invalid by
reason of a stipulated minimum price, and the contested non-signer clause which
states: "Wilfully and knowingly advertising, offering for sale or selling at less
than the minimum price stipulated in any contract entered into pursuant to the
provision of R.S. 51:392, whether the person so advertising, offering for sale, or
selling is or is not a party to the contract, is unfair competition and is actionable
by any person damaged."
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the prices established by the plaintiff through contracts with
other retailers. Injunction was granted by the trial court. On
appeal the court of appeal affirmed the decision, dismissing de-
fendant's contentions as having been settled adversely in a pre-
vious decision of the Louisiana Supreme Court.2 On certiorari,
held, reversed. By subjecting retailers' property rights to the
will of private individuals, the act violated Article III, Section 1,2
of the Louisiana Constitution in that it delegated legislative
power to private persons. Dr. G. H. Tichenor Antiseptic Co. aV.
Schwegmann Brothers Giant Super Markets, 231 La. 51, 90 So.2d
343 (1956).
At the beginning of this century, contracts by which pro-
ducers bound retailers to fixed prices were upheld by courts as
permissible measures to protect goodwill created by brand or
trade names. 4 However, in 1911 the United States Supreme
Court held that any contract by which a producer attempted to
maintain a system to control resale prices was unlawful not only
as a violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act 5 but also as an
unreasonable restraint of trade at common law.6 Pressure tactics
were used by some producers to continue price maintenance,
though such efforts were to some extent curbed by the Federal
Trade Commission.7
Finally, beginning in 1933, state legislatures opened the door
for producers to maintain retail prices by passing fair-trade laws
containing "non-signer" clauses.8 In Old Dearborn Distributing
Co. v. Seagram Distiller" the United States Supreme Court held
such measures to be valid exercises of the state police power
and not improper delegations of the legislative power violating
the "due process" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The de-
cision was based upon "due process" and did not erase the bar-
2. Pepsodent Co. v. Krauss Co., 200 La. 959, 9 So.2d 303 (1942).
3. "The legislative power of the state shall be vested in a legislature. . .
4. Fowle v. Park, 131 U.S. 88 (1889) ; Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Platt, 142
Fed. 606 (N.D. Ill. 1906). See also Note, 60 U. PA. L. REV. 270 (1912).
5. Sherman Act of July 2, 1890, c. 647, § 1, 26 STAT. 209.
6. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park, 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
7. United States v. Colgate, 250 U.S. 300 (1919). Here the producer was boy-
cotting those retailers not complying with his desired price. No price fixing con-
tract had been entered into. The court held that no unfair trade practice had been
committed. For a discussion of cases involving fair trade and the Federal Trade
Commission, see Note, 75 U. PA. L. REV. 248 (1927).
8. California was the first state to adopt a fair trade act. See CALIF. BusI-
NESS AND PROFESSIONS CODE ANN. §§ 16900-16905 (Deering 1951). This act and
all other statutes referred to as "fair trade acts" are substantially the same, con-
taining a contract clause and a non-signer clause. See note 1 supra.
9. 299 U.S. 183 (1936).
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rier presented by the Sherman Act. However, Congress passed
the Miller-Tydings Act 10 which exempted from condemnation of
the Sherman Act contracts which prescribed minimum prices,
if such contracts were in accordance with state laws. Thus the
states were left to decide whether to allow fair trade; and all but
three states eventually passed fair-trade acts containing the
"non-signer" clause." But the Miller-Tydings Act had neglected
to include the "non-signer" clause in authorizing state fair-trade
laws. Because of this omission, the Supreme Court of the United
States in 1951 declared the "non-signer" clause in the Louisiana
Fair Trade Act a violation of the Sherman Act.12 However, once
again Congress acted, this time passing the McGuire Act 13 which
amended the Miller-Tydings Act so as to contain the "non-
signer" clause. Of the twenty-one fair-trade laws reviewed since
passage of the McGuire Act, twelve have been declared uncon-
stitutional.14
The validity of the Louisiana Fair Trade Act was considered
and upheld by the Supreme Court of this state under the anti-
10. 50 STAT. 693 (1937), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1948).
11. Every state but Texas, Vermont, and Missouri passed similar statutes.
Until 1952, only two courts of last resort had declared a fair trade act Invalid.
See Liquor Store Inc. v. Continental Distilling Corp., 40 So.2d 371 (Fla. 1949) ;
Shakespeare Co. v. Lippman's Tool Shop Sporting Goods Co., 334 Mich. 109, 54
N.W.2d 268 (1952).
12. Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951).
13. 66 STAT. 631, 632 (1952), 15 U.S.C. §45 (1952).
14. The following cases held state fair trade acts invalid: Union Carbide &
Carbon Corp. v. White River Distributors, 224 Ark. 558, 275 S.W.2d 455 (1955)
Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp. v. Francis, 301 P.2d 139 (Colo. 1956); Miles
Laboratories v. Eckerd, 73 So.2d 680 (Fla. 1954) Grayson-Robinson Stores v.
Oneida, Ltd., 209 Ga. 613, 75 S.E.2d 161 (1952); Bargain Barn, Inc. v. Arvin
Industries Inc., CCH TRADE REG. REP. (1955 Trade Cas.) 68074, at 70463
(Super. Ct. Marion County, 1955) (Ind.); General Electric Co. v. American
Buyers, C-IH TRADE REG. REP. (1956 Trade Cas.) 68341, at 71514 (Jefferson
County Cir., 1956) (Ky.) ; McGraw Electric Co. v. Lewis & Smith Drug Co.,
159 Neb. 703, 68 N.W.2d 608 (1955); Skaggs Drug Center v. General Electric
Co., CCH TRADE REG. REP. (1957 Trade Cas.) 68823, at 73329 (Sup. Ct. Colo.
1957) ; General Electric Co. v. Wahle, 207 Ore. 302, 296 P.2d 635 (1956) ; Rogers-
Kent, Inc. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., CCH TRADE GEo. REP. (1955 Trade
Cas.) 68084, at 70481 (Richland County, 1955) (S.C.) ; General Electric Co.
v. Thrifty Sales Inc., 5 Utah 2d 326, 301 P.2d 741 (1956); Benruss Co. v.
Smith-Williams Jewelers, CCH TRADE REQ REP. (1955 Trade Cas.) 67985,
at 70197 (Richmond Law & Eq. Ct., 1955) (Va.). Those state courts hold-
ing for the validity of fair trade acts since 1952 are the following: Scovill
Manufacturing Co. v. Skaggs Pay Less Drug Stores, 45 Cal.2d 281, 291 P.2d 936
(1955) ; General Electric Co. v. Klein, 106 A.2d 206 (Del. 1954) ; Home Utilities
Co. v. Revere Copper & Brass, 122 A.2d 109 (Md. 1956) ; General Electric Co. v.
Kimball Jewelers, 132 N.E.2d 652 (Mass. 1956) ; Lionel Corp. v. Grayson-Robin-
son Stores, 15 N.J. 191, 104 A.2d 304 (1954); General Electric Co. v. Masters
Inc., 307 N.Y. 229, 120 N.E.2d 255 (1955) ; Union Carbide and Carbon Corp.%v.
Bargain Fair, 130 N.E.2d 255 (Ohio Com. P1. 1955) ; Burche Co. v. General
Electric Co., 382 Pa. 370, 115 A.2d 361 (1956) ; Bulova Watch Co. v. Anderson,
270 Wis. 21, 70 N.W.2d 243 (1955).
NOTES
trust provision of the Louisiana Constitution1 5 in Pepsodent Co.
v. Krauss.16 The court held in that case that the constitutional
provision in question did not limit the state in exercising its
police power; the police power was only limited in that it could
not be used arbitrarily or unreasonably. Using the rationale of
the Dearborn decision, 17 the court held that the act was not an
abuse of the police power.
The fact that the Pepsodent case dealt with the constitution-
ality of the Fair Trade Act under the anti-trust provision of the
Louisiana Constitution and did not treat the problem of delega-
tion of legislative power distinguishes that case from the present
one. The court in the instant case reasoned that an individual
possesses a right to sell his property at whatever price he pleases,
and that this right can be taken away and regulated only by the
Legislature in the exercise of its police power. Thus, in allowing
producers and distributors to fix minimum prices binding non-
contracting parties, the Legislature was delegating its power
and subjecting the retailer's rights to the will of private per-
sons, contrary to Article III, Section 1, of the State Constitu-
tion.'8 To justify the delegation of the price-fixing function to
producers would be impossible unless the producer could be said
to retain same property right in the commodity after it was sold
to the retailer. Such a right, as the court pointed out, would
amount to burdening ownership of a chattel by imposition of
some implied covenant, condition, or servitude - devices not
recognized in Louisiana law.19 The main problem facing the
court was the Dearborn decision, which, though dealing with a
federal constitutional question, nevertheless was cited with favor
in the Pepsodent case. The court pointed out that the Pepsodent
case did not deal with delegation of power, nor could the United
States Supreme Court in a situation such as that presented in the
15. LA. CONST. art. XIX, § 14. This provision condemns all "combinations,
trusts, or conspiracies in restraint of trade, commerce, or business."
16. 200 La. 959, 9 So.2d 303 (1942).
17. 299 U.S. 183 (1936).
18. See note 3 eupra.
19. Dr. G. H. Tichenor Antiseptic Co. v. Schwegmann Bros. Giant Super
Markets, 231 La. 51, 71, 90 So.2d 343, 350, n. 10 (1957) : "Equitable servitudes
running with a movable and restraints on the alienation of movable property are
disfavored under the public policy of this State. Once a movable is sold, the seller
relinquishes all interest therein and conditional sales, whereby the vendor retains
title to the property, are not recognized in Louisiana. Barber Asphalt Paving Co.
v. St. Louis Cypress Co., 121 La. 152, 46 So. 193 (1908) ; Lee Const. Co. v. L.M.
Ray Const. Corp., 219 La. 246, 52 So.2d 841 and cases there cited. And, until
1912, chattel mortgages were unknown in this State." The court also cited LA.
CIVIL CODE arts. 490-491 (1870).
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Dearborn case resolve conflicts between state legislation and the
State Constitution. The court furthermore observed that in 1951
the United States Supreme Court had found the Louisiana stat-
ute to be a "price-fixing" statute, a finding contrary to that in
the Dearborn case.20
The decision in the present case reflects a trend toward re-
appraisal of fair trade legislation,2 1 apparently incited by the
United States Supreme Court decision in 1952,22 and the sub-
sequent McGuire Act. That fair trade perhaps protects good
will of producers and stops "loss leading" tactics is an issue not
to be entirely disregarded. But the chief argument for fair trade
is that it affords protection for the "little man" who cannot with-
stand competition of large-scale operations. 23 On the other hand,
opponents of fair trade point out that the public is hurt by being
denied the benefits of this competition. 24 Thus, in the context
of public policy, the result of the instant case is to preserve the
benefits of competition by permitting the large-scale operators
to offer fair-trade goods for sale at lower prices. Also, the legal
determination by the court in this instance protects the retailers'
property rights against an unfettered exercise of the will by pri-
vate persons.
James Farrier
CRIMINAL LAW-MISAPPROPRIATION OF FUNDS OF A COMMERCIAL
PARTNERSHIP BY ONE OF THE PARTNERS
Defendant partner allegedly withdrew funds from the part-
nership bank account and converted them to his own use. The
district court sustained a motion to quash the information filed
against the defendant for theft of partnership funds. On appeal
by the state, held, affirmed. Since the partner can eventually be
held liable for the entire debt of a commercial partnership of
20. Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951). The
argument that the Supreme Court in this case had overruled the Dearborn deci-
sion was quashed in Schwegmann Bros. v. Eli Lily & Co., 205 F.2d 788 (5th Cir.
1953). This case considered and upheld the McGuire Act.
21. See note 14 supra.
22. Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951).
23. Two chief arguments for fair trade are that the manufacturer's trade mark
has been "exploited and cheapened" and the small retailers driven out of business
by sales of brands below cost. The chief fear is of "price wars" which will trample
the little men down. See Fulda, Resale Price Maintenance, 21 U. Cni. L. REV.
175 (1954), for a full analysis of arguments for and against fair trade.
24. "In addition many newspapers and magazines throughout the country hailed
the Schwegmann decision as a victory for the consumer and the free enterprise
system . . . Fortune magazine repeatedly attacked the fair-trade laws as economi-
cally unsound and harmful to the best interests of consumers." Id. at 186-87.
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